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I describe protocols which assure the recipient of a quantum state that it has
come from a sender with whom he has previously shared secret key. Their secu-
rity is information-theoretic (\unconditional") rather than based on computational
assumptions. A particular class of such protocols is constructed, for which the
dierent keys correspond to dierent, secret, quantum error detecting codes. The
codes correspond to points on an algebraic curve over a nite eld. These protocols
have probability of undetected tampering inverse in the number of keys, which is
better than the classical bound of inverse in the square root of the number of keys.
They are ecient in that the required key length for a given security parameter
(negative log of probability of undetected tampering) grows only logarithmically
in message size, while the security parameter grows linearly with key size. Thus
their security and eciency are similar to, but even stronger than, those of the
classical Wegman-Carter protocols.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, authentication, error detecting codes, uncon-
ditional security, message authentication codes, universal hash functions
1 Introduction
Reliably ensuring that a communication comes from its purported sender, or that stored
data has not been tampered with, is an important problem in classical communications
networks and data storage systems. The analogous problem, of assuring oneself that a
quantum state received over a quantum communications network or stored in quantum
memory has come from its purported sender, could also become important if quantum
computation or other forms of quantum information-processing ever come into use.
Wegman and Carter [1] [2] showed how to transfer security associated with a secret key
to the authentication of a message much longer than the key, if secrecy of the message
is not a concern. While the probability of an adversary getting the recipient to accept a
message dierent from the authentic one may be greater than the probability of guessing
the secret key, it is not too much greater; the secret key still gives good control over
the probability of successful tampering. In this paper, I give a method for achieving a
similar assurance of authenticity for quantum messages. For a protocol from this class,
the set of keys is a set of quantum error detecting codes, chosen in a particular geometric
fashion. A quantum state is encoded in one of these codes, and the state rejected as
inauthentic if an error is detected by the recipient. The geometry of the set of codes
ensures that any given error from a \unitary error basis" is undetectable in at most a
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small fraction of the codes. This ensures that a forger who does not know which code
was used is very likely to be detected. This gives an upper bound on the probability
of undetected tampering is inverse in the number of keys, which is better than the
classical bound of inverse in the square root of this number. Moreover, as with the
classical Wegman-Carter schemes, the security parameter drops only logarithmically
with message size, allowing ecient authentication in the sense that the message may
be exponentially longer than the key before security drops signicantly.
Independently and concurrently, Claude Crepeau, Daniel Gottesman, Adam Smith
and Alain Tapp [3] have investigated quantum data authentication, using ideas from
error correction and quantum cryptography, also including the idea of a randomly cho-
sen error detecting code. We had discussions at various times during the development
of our protocols, but decided the results and approaches were dierent enough that
separate publications would make sense. While also exploiting the idea of a randomly
chosen error detecting code, they obtain complementary results that shed light on
the interesting relationship between secrecy and authentication in quantum mechanics:
their codes achieve both perfect quantum secrecy and a given degree of authentication,
and meet a lower bound on the key length of codes that do both these tasks, whereas
the codes considered herein meet a lower bound on the key length of schemes aimed
solely at authentication.
Debbie Leung’s work [4] on key recycling in quantum encryption can also be in-
terpreted as providing quantum data authentication, without incidental encryption,
as can the initial phase of some quantum key distribution protocols, although these
methods (discussed further in Section 6 do not beat the classical bound relating key
length and security parameter.
Section 2 discusses classical authentication codes. It provides background for those
interested in comparing the present codes to classical ones, but may be skipped by
those interested only in the quantum construction. Section 3 denes a notion of quan-
tum message authentication code (QMAC). Section 4 introduces the idea of a quantum
stabilizer code-based QMAC, and reviews the part of the theory of stabilizer quantum
error-correction codes which is relevant for these QMACs (and might be skipped by
experts on stabilizer codes). In Section 5, a particular class of stabilizer QMACs is
constructed from normal rational curves on the projective geometries of nite vector
spaces, and the QMACs thus constructed are shown to have the strong security prop-
erties described above. Section 6 discusses the relation of quantum message authen-
tication to other quantum cryptographic protocols such as quantum key distribution
and the encryption of quantum states, and concludes.
2 Classical authentication codes
I begin with a very general discussion of classical message authentication codes (MACs)
paralleling that in [5] (except that Maurer also considers multiple-use codes.) Dene a
MAC to be a nite set M of messages m, a nite set C of ciphertexts c, and a set K of
keys k, an encoding rule (possibly stochastic) which gives a distribution for ciphertext c
depending on k,m, and a decoding rule, again possibly stochastic, giving a distribution
over the union of the message space with an additional symbol \FAIL," depending on
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c, k. The symbol \FAIL" is supposed to represent the detection by the recipient of
tampering with the intended message. Most authors require that the decoded symbol
(message m0, or FAIL symbol) be determined by the ciphertext c, in a manner which
is nonstochastic. Maurer, in particular, requires:
The ciphertext and key uniquely determine the sent message m. (M)
That is, if there has been no tampering, the message may be inferred with certainty.
This would seem to rule out stochastic decoding. Maurer states that this is \without
loss of generality." It is indeed plausible that stochastic decoding is always suboptimal,
but since the situation may be game-theoretic, care is warranted since in game theory,
mixed strategies may be equilibria. The examples of authentication codes considered
here will have deterministic decoding. The term ciphertext suggests that after encoding,
the message is to some extent secret; although this may be the case, it need not be so
and in a classical system, no secrecy is necessary for extremely secure authentication.
(In fact, I think it is never necessary to use secrecy to increase security, and is probably
generally inecient.) An attack on such a system consists of a forgery rule, possibly
stochastic, which gives, for each ciphertext c, a distribution over ciphertexts. Various
notions of success probability may be considered, but we will focus on the weakest.
The success probability for an attack on message m is the total probability (over the
random choice of key, as well as any other stochastic processes involved) that, when
the encoding rule, forgery rule, and decoding rule are applied to m, it is decoded to a
message m0 6= m, and not to \FAIL". (Note that when stochastic decoding is involved,
this may be nonzero even for the forgery rule which consists in doing nothing.) We will
consider only the noise-free situation, so that any errors in decoding are due either to
tampering, or design features of the system.
With deterministic decoding, and a system in which the key and ciphertext uniquely
determine the message, there are only two types of error to consider. Type I consists in
accepting the received m0 as authentic when it is not what was sent. Type II consists
in rejecting m0 when it is what was sent.
If each message also corresponds to a unique ciphertext, then the authentication
system is usually termed \Cartesian". Under this condition, it provides no secrecy.
Much of the literature has been restricted to the Cartesian case. There may be good
reason for this: it is probably the case that non-Cartesian schemes require more key
to achieve the same level of authentication. The idea is that there is likely to be a
tradeo between the use of key for authentication and for secrecy: one does not imply
the other.
To illustrate the workings of classical authentication protocols, we present a par-
ticular type of Cartesian classical authentication scheme, an authentication tag system
[6]. Dene an authentication tag system to be a set M of messages, a set T of tags, and
a publicly known set F of functions f : M ! T . The choice of an f 2 F is the shared
classical secret key of the protocol. The protocol proceeds by the sender choosing a
message m, calculating its authentication tag f(m), and sending both m and f(m) to
the recipient on a public channel. The recipient recieves some pair g1(m, f(m)) 2 M ,
g2(m, f(m)) 2 T , which are equal to m, f(m) unless they have been tampered with.
(The function g is thus a (deterministic) forgery rule. More generally, we would let
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g1 2 M,g2 2 T be distributed according to an (m, f(m))-dependent probability dis-
tribution.) The recipient calculates f(m0); if the calculated tag f(m0) of the received
message is equal to the received tag f(m)0, then he accepts the message as genuine. The
protocol works because without knowing f , it is very hard to nd another message-tag
pair m0,f(m0) even given knowledge of one pair m, f(m). Call an authentication tag
system p-secure if for any message m and function g : M T !M T the probability
(over a uniform random choice of f from F ) that g(m, f(m)) is a valid message tag-pair
(equals m0, f(m0) for some m0 6= m) is less than p. The minimum p for which the system
is p-secure is dened to be the \error probability", pe. This is the type I error for test-
ing the hypothesis that the state has been substituted by an incorrect state. (The tag
system is designed so that the probability of type II error is zero.) Often, we will refer
to the security level, dened by the exponential security parameter  := − log pe. High-
security protocols are obtained from universal2 (or almost-universal2) families of hash
functions: sets of K functions from M elements to T elements such that the fraction
of functions taking a given m to a given t is K/T (or 2K/T ). Given an input-output
pair (observed by a forger in an insecure channel, say), we still have probability only
T/K of guessing the correct function. To make it hard to guess the function from an
input-output pair, we need every pair which is an input-output pair for one function in
the class to also be an input-output pair for a large number of functions in the class,
for once we know the input-output pair we need only guess among that large number
of functions. But we still cannot have this large number of functions be most of the
class|for if it is a substantial fraction of the class, then this input-output pair will
be a valid message-tag pair independent of the key, and so a forger will be able to
substitute it for a dierent pair with little chance of being caught. It is the interplay
between these two considerations which gives a bound of 1/
p
K, rather than 1/K, for
the failure probability of a classical MAC.
As an example, the set of all linear functions from (Fq)m to (Fq)t is universal2,
but it it is undesirably large, since there are qmt such functions (mt matrix entries
drawn from Fq). Wegman and Carter constructed \ecient" almost-universal classes
of hash functions from \inecient" ones by a construction involving breaking the input
string into subsections much shorter than the overall message, and calculating a tag for
each of the subsections using inecient hash functions, and then applying this same
procedure to the concatenation of the resulting tags until there is only one tag left.
They also used the notion of universaln classes of hash functions to obtain multiple-
use hash functions. In such a class, observing n input-output pairs still gives one
probability no better than about 1/K
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n+1 of guessing another input-output pair. Thus
for classical schemes designed for a xed number of repeated uses, as the number of
uses the scheme is designed for increases, the behavior of the bound on the failure
probability approaches 1/K, but for no xed n is this behavior attained. In contrast,
the quantum protocols presented below have error probability going as 1/K even for
single-use protocols. The obvious attack of just randomly guessing the key makes it
clear that this bound is tight, so there is less incentive for investigating multiple-use
quantum protocols.
The idea of authentication tag schemes, and some bounds and constructions, rst
appeared in print in [6]; the problem was suggested to them by Gus Simmons. Wegman
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and Carter [1] gave the rst ecient family of schemes, in the sense that the schemes
are O(2− log jT j)-secure, that is, exponentially secure in the key bit-length log jT j, for
xed message bit-length log jM j while having only very slow growth of the required
key-size to attain a xed security parameter, as the message bit-length grows.
3 Quantum data authentication
Definition 1: A quantum message authentication code with classical key (QMAC)
will consist of nite-dimensional message Hilbert space M and cipher Hilbert space C.
(Where it will cause no confusion, I will also denote by M and C the dimensions of M
and C.) An encoding will be a trace-preserving completely positive (TPCP) map Ek
chosen from a set K of such maps from B(M) to B(C), the spaces of linear operators on
M and C. (We could also consider schemes with arbitrary, not even necessarily linear,
trace-preserving encoding maps from B(M) to B(C); this corresponds to \preparation
visible" encoding.) A decoding will be a pair of trace-decreasing CP maps Dk,Fk,
which sum to a trace-preserving one, from B(C) to B(M). These represent a key-
dependent measurement with two outcomes, corresponding to the two maps: Dk, which
represents the \no tampering" measurement result, and Fk, which is interepreted as
indicating tampering (F for \forgery", or \FAIL"). If \no tampering" is obtained, the
state produced by the map Dk, renormalized to have unit trace, results, and is accepted
as the authentic state transmitted by the sender. We suppose that between encoding
and decoding, a forger may perform an arbitrary TPCP map A on the system C.
We also note that a quantum authentication code with quantum and classical key
may be dened. In such a system, Alice and Bob could share a (possibly entangled)
state ρABk of a quantum key system Q  AB; this could even depend on the value of the
classical key, as the subscript indicates. Encoding and decoding maps would then be
CP-maps from AM ! AC (encoding) and from BC ! BM (decoding). For example,
a scheme with classical keys k chosen with probabilities pk may be used as the basis for
a scheme with only quantum key. The quantum scheme is to have Alice and Bob share




k jkAijkBi, and perform a quantum-coherent version of
the classical protocol on this superposition of shared orthogonal \classical" key states
jki.
We now specialize to a particular, slightly simpler type of QMAC with classical key.
A quantum authentication tag system will consist of nite-dimensional message and
tag Hilbert spaces M and T , and a publicly known set of unitaries, indexed by a nite
set K, acting on M ⊗ T . To use such a system, the sender and recipient secretly agree
on some k 2 K and a standard state j0T i 2 T . Then the sender prepares his desired
message jψi 2 M , applies Uk, and sends the result UkjψM ij0T i to the recipient. The
recipient applies U yk , and measures T in a basis containing j0T i, accepting the state of
M as authentic if the result corresponding to j0T i is obtained.
We suppose a forger may perform an arbitrary quantum operation A  fAig be-
tween the encoding and decoding, with the object of substituting for the state Ukjψij0i
a state with high probability of passing Bob’s test, but such that upon passing the test,
the state of M does not have high delity to jψi. After the encoding with Uk, forgery
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U ykAiUkjψij0ih0jhψjU ykAyiUk . (1)
Dene the probability of failure, or probability of successful tampering, pf to be the




tr (I − jψihψj)M ⊗ j0ih0jρoutk  p . (2)
For high security, we wish pf to be small, preferably of order 1/T =: 2−t, which should
be of order 1/K =: 2−k as well. That is, the component of the output state which
passes the authentication test but does not lie along the authentic state, is negligible,
exponentially small in the classical key information k := logK. The exponential secu-
rity parameter is − log pf . (A weaker security criterion would be to average uniformly
over states jψi in the above. The criterion above is extremely strong, insofar as it must
hold even if the operation A is selected by a forger who knows jψi.)
4 Stabilizer coding and authentication
The quantum message authentication codes we introduce in this paper are constructed
using quantum error correcting codes. A QMAC of this type is a publicly known set of
K quantum error correcting codes; Alice and Bob have secretly agreed on one of these
codes. The identity of this code is the key value. The number of key bits is thus logK.
Each of these codes is a subspace, large enough to contain the quantum message, of a
larger Hilbert space, together with a particular isometry from the message space into
the code subspace, which is used to encode the state. The codes are used in error
detection mode: the recipient checks to see if the state of the quantum system is still
in the code subspace; if not, it is rejected as inauthentic, while if it is, it is decoded via
the inverse of the encoding isometry, and Bob accepts it as authentic.
In order to construct such QMACs with high security, we will use the most well-
studied kind of quantum codes, stabilizer codes. We will assume the basic quantum
systems have prime dimension q (for q=2, this is the familiar case of qubits).
Definition 1 A stabilizer QMAC is a set of K quantum stabilizer codes on M ⊗ T ,
where M has dimension qm and T has dimension qt, i.e. M and T may be thought of
as consisting of m q-ary quantum systems and t q-ary quantum systems respectively.
Each code will encode m q-ary systems, that is, it will be of dimension qm, just large
enough to contain states of M .
In the remainder of this section we review the theory behind stabilizer codes for q-ary
systems; readers familiar with this material may wish to skip this subsection, or skim
it for notation.
In studying and constructing codes for correcting or detecting quantum errors, it is
useful to represent error processes in terms of unitary bases for the space of operators on
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the channel Hilbert space. One such is the \shift/phase" error basis on d-dimensional
Hilbert space, dened via:
Eab := SaP b , (3)
where hijSjji := δi,j−1, hijP jji := ξiδi,j , are the standard-basis matrix elements of the
\shift by one" and \ramp the phase by one" operators. (Here, indices are in the ring of
integers mod d.) This basis has appeared regularly in mathematics, and also physics.
Its operators represent a natural unitary (rather than Hermitian) generalization of
the Pauli matrices to higher dimension. As far as I am aware, they were introduced
into quantum information theory, in [7], for teleportation on d-dimensional systems.
The theory of nice error bases, of which the shift-phase bases are a special case, was
developed and used by Knill in [8] and [9]. In general, my exposition will follow Knill.
One usually represents an error process by a completely positive linear map, which
may be written in a \Hellwig-Kraus (HK) decomposition", as ρ ! A(ρ) = ∑iAiρAyi ,




iAi = I. But the Ai, although not unique,
depend on the operation: the HK decomposition does not express any operation in








The condition that A be completely positive (have an HK decomposition) is then
that aij be a positive matrix, as may be veried by expanding the Ak in the basis
Ei. Operators, although they form a Hilbert space, have the additional structure
of an algebra|a vector space with product having nice relations to the vector space
structure. This is relevant, since we care about what happens when dierent operations
succeed each other, and when successive operations are expanded in an operator basis,
the operator components are multiplied. The additional structure means that dierent
orthonormal operator bases are less similar than dierent bases of an arbitrary Hilbert
space: they are distinguished by properties involving the interaction of the product
and the Hilbert-space structure. Unitarity of the basis operators is such a property,
useful because inner-product preservation under error operators and products of these
helps keep track of probabilities and probability amplitudes. We will want a further
property: the product of two error operators is, up to a phase factor, another operator
from the basis. This is Knill’s condition of niceness of a unitary error basis. It removes
the need for a diagonalization process in analyzing the composition of operations (for
example, the composition of encoding, noise or tampering, and decoding). Formally,
an orthonormal error basis Ei is nice if
EiEj = αijEij (5)
where i j is a binary operation on the index set. Knill shows that the αij are complex
phase factors (have unit modulus) and the product i  j is a group operation on the
indices (we will call this group the index group). He also shows that by choosing each
Ei to have unit determinant (an arbitrary basis can be chosen with this form just by
multiplying each operator by a phase factor), the αij become d-th roots of unity, and
the error basis is said to be very nice.
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Thus, a nice error basis generates a group E of unitary operators; the center Z(E)
of this group (the set of operators which commute with all operators of the group) is
made up of scalar multiples of the identity. The scalars are d-th roots of unity, if the
basis is very nice. Dividing out the center gives a quotient group, which we denote
E, isomorphic to the index group. Each element of this quotient group corresponds
to one operator in the error basis (it corresponds to a coset of the center which has
this operator as representative, in other words, it corresponds to the operator modulo
phase.) E is a central extension of E by Z(E). Also, since E is given as a set of
unitary operators, these form a faithful unitary representation of E, and a projective
representation of the index group E. These closely related aspects of unitary error
bases, as central extensions and as projective representations, may be studied using
the theory of group cohomology, with the goal of characterizing the possible nice error
bases, and the groups that may occur as index groups, etc... although we will not need
this theory here [10], [11].
For the shift/phase basis, the group E is generated by S,P . A more explicit form for
this error basis is hijEabjji = δi,j−aξbi. The index group of these bases is the product of





j = αijαjiI. Thus the commutator subgroup is Abelian, and is in the
center. The commutator is uniquely determined by the map it induces from the pairs
of indices i, j to the phase factors αijαji. The commutation structure of E is thus fully
described by a function from EE to the unit-modulus complex numbers. The group
E is nonabelian, but in the very common case where the index group is the product
of an Abelian group and its dual 1 (the shift/phase basis providing one example, since
the cyclic group is self-dual), the commutation map E is determined by a symplectic
form B, sometimes called \bicharacter," on the index group [12], [10]. That is, writing
the index group additively, B is alternating:
B(x, x) = 1, (6)
bilinear (the linearity looks nonstandard because the relevant Abelian group structure
of the unit modulus complex numbers is written multiplicatively):
B(x, y + z) = B(x, y)B(x, z); B(x+ y, z) = B(x, z)B(y, z) (7)
and nondegenerate:
If B(x, y) = 1 for all x, then y = 1. (8)
The form has values in the complex unit circle. But if the error basis is very nice on
a pn dimensional Hilbert space, the values will be p-th roots of unity, and we may
instead use a form with values in Fp, substituting addition in Fp for the isomorphic
multiplicative group generated by a primitive p-th root of unity in S1. The symplectic
conditions then look more standard (since they are equivalent to saying that for a xed
y 2 E, B(, y) and B(y, ) are homomorphisms into the additive group of Fp). Explicitly
1The dual of an Abelian group G is the group of homomorphisms of G into S1. In other words, it
is the group of characters of G.
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(retaining the name B for the symplectic form):
B(x, y + z) = B(x, y) +B(x, z) ;B(x+ y, z) = B(x, z) +B(y, z) ;
(8xB(x, y) = 0) ) y = 0 ;
8xB(x, x) = 0 . (9)
The set of all tensor products Ei ⊗ Fj of operators of nice error bases Ei and Fj on
two spaces is a nice error basis for the tensor product of the spaces. (The same holds
with \nice" replaced by \very nice.") To analyze pn-ary quantum codes, a standard
approach is to use as an error basis the n-fold tensor products of the p-ary error basis.
The index group may be identied with the additive group of the 2n-dimensional vector
space over Fp; this is equipped with an Fp-valued symplectic form.
This structure is useful in constructing quantum error-correcting codes, and ana-
lyzing which errors from the unitary error basis they can detect or correct. The phase
of an error operator is irrelevant to whether it can be corrected or detected, so it is
adequate to represent errors by their indices. Tensor product bases are often useful
because the tensor factors may model physical subsystems, and the error structure be
related to this subsytem structure on physical grounds. For example, ‘high-weight"
errors aecting many subsystems at once may be infrequent. No such physical motiva-
tion is used in this paper, though, because the attacker is assumed able to do any error
operator, indeed any trace-preserving CP map. The role of the tensor product structure
of the quantum system is rather to help provide tractable mathematical constructions,
through the natural relation of the tensor product of q-ary quantum systems to certain
nite geometries. The commutation structure, given by the symplectic form, is impor-
tant because a very important way of specifying quantum error-correcting codes is by
specifying Abelian subgroups of the error group. If such a subgroup has m indepen-
dent generators, each one has q possible eigenvalues, and each one of the qm possible
sequences of m eigenvalues (one eigenvalue for each of the the m generators) corre-
sponds to a qn−m-dimensional subspace of Hilbert space. This is the space of vectors
which are simultaneously eigenvectors of each of the m generators, with the specied
eigenvalues. These qm subspaces are orthogonal, and one of them (usually the one with
all eigenvalues 1) may be chosen as the quantum code H0k , where the quantum state is
to be placed, and the others will be \syndromes" representing dierent possible places
a noise process may take the coded state. Error detection is achieved by measuring
whether the state is still in the code or not; correction is achieved by measuring which
of the syndrome spaces the state is in, and for each result, mapping the state isomet-
rically back into the code subspace (the choice of these isometries partially determines
which errors may be corrected).
In terms of the geometry of the index group, viewed as a symplectic space, the set
of generators for the Abelian subgroup which denes a quantum code corresponds to a
basis for a totally isotropic subspace C of the index space. A totally isotropic subspace
is one for which for any x, y in the subspace, B(x, y) = 0. Thus total isotropy of C
ensures the corresponding subgroup of E is Abelian. Since states in the code Hilbert
subspace H0 are simultaneous eigenstates of all the stabilizer operators, errors S with
index in C act as the identity on such states (\stabilize" H0 pointwise, whence the
name \stabilizer codes"). Errors X with index in C? commute with every stabilizer
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operator S, so they satisfy SXjψi = XSjψi = Xjψi for states jψi 2 H0, whence Xjψi
is in H0. If in addition X’s index is not in C itself, we know it does not act as the
identity on H0, although it keeps the state within H0. It is an \undetectable error"
in the strong sense of \error": undetectable because it keeps things within the code,
error because it does not act as the identity. Thus the set of undetectable errors for a
stabilizer code C is precisely C? − C.
5 Stabilizer-based authentication codes from normal ra-
tional curves
To construct authentication protocols with jM j = qm, jT j = qt, we will use tensor
products of operators from a qm-ary error basis with operators from a qt-ary error basis.
Our construction will require t to divide (m+t). Thus m is a multiple of t, say m =: ~rt;
then m+ t = rt, where r := ~r+ 1. Thus the overall nite vector space is V (2rt, q). We
will want to specify some number K of t-spaces (keys). For our construction, it will be
useful to view V (2rt, q) as the nite eld Fq2rt . This is done via a bijection between the
Galois eld of order pn and the vector space of dimension n over Fp. Such a bijection
is chosen in the usual construction of Fpn as an extension eld of Fp. (The choice
corresponds to a choice of irreducible polynomial over Fp.) The bijection identies a
particular occurrence of Fp as a subeld of Fpn with the scalars (which are elements
of Fp) in the vector space structure. Under this \canonical" bijection, addition in the
vector space V (n, q) maps to addition in the eld Fpn ; scalar multiplication in the vector
space maps to eld multiplication of an arbitrary eld element (corresponding to any
element of the vector space) on the right, by an element of (the canonical occurrence
of) the subeld Fp on the left. Such a standard bijection exists even if p is not prime,
but rather equal to qn for some prime q. Thus we may view Fq2rt as an extension eld
of Fqt , or as an extension eld of Fq, via canonical bijections between the eld and
either V (2rt, q) or V (2r, qt).
We consider a normal rational curve in PG(2r − 1, qt) (the projective geometry
whose points are the 1-d subspaces of V (2r, qt)). (See, e.g., the excellent introductory
text [13].) Such a curve is given by:
 := f[1 : y : y2 :    : y2r−1], [0 : 0 : 0 :    : 1]gy2Fqt . (10)
Here y ranges over Fqt and the colon is used to separate the coordinates of a projective
point, to indicate that all that matters is their ratio.
Each of these qt + 1 1-spaces of V (2r, qt) corresponds to a t-space of V (2rt, q),
via composition of canonical bijections between these spaces and Fq2rt . Formally, this
correspondence is given by a map
σ : hxi 7! hαxiα . (11)
The notation hexpr(α)iα refers to the linear span of those elements given by the ex-
pression expr(α), as α takes all its possible values. For each argument x of this map,
α ranges over all those elements of Fq2rt which are in the canonical occurence of Fqt
as a subeld of Fq2rt . There are a total of qt + 1 such spaces, each corresponding to a
quantum code encoding (r − 1)t q-ary systems into r q-ary systems.
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The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (a) The qt + 1 t-subspaces Ck of V (2rt, q) corresponding to the qt + 1
points of the normal rational curve  on PG(2r, qt), constitute a quantum stabilizer
message authentication code encoding (r − 1)t q-ary systems into rt q-ary systems.




Proof: (a) By our denition of a quantum stabilizer QMAC, we need only show that
the t-spaces Ck are totally isotropic. For by the standard construction of stabilizer
codes over q-ary quantum alphabets outlined in the previous section, this will imply
that each one gives rise to a quantum stabilizer code with the stated parameters. To
do this, we introduce a symplectic form that makes all the Ck totally isotropic. Dene,
on Fq2rt , the symplectic form






This is also a symplectic form on V (2rt, Fq), under the canonical correspondence with
Fq2rt . Now,










= αβ(x, y) . (14)
(We have used the fact that F s , the multiplicative group of Fs, is cyclic of order s− 1,
so αs = α. In particular, αq
rt
= α and βq
rt
= β.) Fix an x 2 Ck − f0g. Every y 2 Ck
may be written as αx, for some α 2 Fqt . Now (x, x) = 0. So, (αx, βx) = 0, i.e., Ck is
totally isotropic under the symplectic form (13).
(b) We begin by establishing the stated security level against \Pauli attacks," and
then a simple lemma extends it to general attacks. (A Pauli attack is one for which the
forgery operation A has the generalized Pauli form. That is, it has a Hellwig-Kraus
decomposition fppxExg in terms of the shift/phase (often called \generalized Pauli")
error basis Ex.) For stabilizer QMACs, the set of possible codes is a K-set of of t-
dimensional totally isotropic subspaces Ck indexed by k. We ask: for a given error
index (vector in V (2(m + t), q)), what is an upper bound on the number of C?k − Ck
it can belong to? For C?k − Ck is precisely the set of errors undetectable by code k.
So if we divide this upper bound by the number K of codes, we have bounded the
maximum, over all errors the forger might choose, of the probability (with respect to
a uniform random choice of code) of the error’s going undetected.
An upper bound on the number of C?k an error can belong to is also an upper bound
on the number of C?k − Ck it can belong to, and since jCkj is small compared to jC?k j
in our context, it will be a good enough bound. Consider an arbitrary error operator
Ex corresponding to x 2 V (2(m+ t), q). x 2 C?k means B(x, y) = 0 for all y 2 Ck. For
t y’s each in a dierent one-dimensional subspace of Ck, these linear equations will be
independent. So, each Ck for which x 2 C?k knocks out dim(Ck)  t subspaces of the
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overall space as possible basis vectors of a subspace containing x. For a good bound,
we want a construction such that as we add more values of k the equations B(x, yi) = 0
for yi 2 Ck are linearly independent from the equations for earlier values of k (until we
reach the total dimension’s worth of equations and this is no longer possible). Then it
will quickly become inconsistent to assume x 2 C?k for too many values of k, because
we will quickly impose more than the overall dimension’s worth of linearly independent
equations on x. In other words, we want the 1-d subspaces in
⋃
k PG(Ck) to be in
general position. A set of points in a projective geometry of dimension d − 1 are said
to be in general position if any d (= dimension of the underlying vector space, when,
as in our case, such exists) of them are linearly independent. The points on the normal
rational curve  are in general position. (To verify this one shows that for any 2r points
on the curve, the determinant of the matrix of their coordinates is nonzero; these are
easily evaluated Vandermonde determinants. More abstractly, the proposition follows
from the fact that the curve is a quasi-projective variety of degree 2r, though the
calculation establishing this is essentially the same.) The normal rational curve is a
particularly good source of such points for our purposes, because it gives us a very
large|probably as large as possible|set of points in general position, which means
that the ratio of the maximal number of codes in which an error can be undetectable
to the total number of codes is low.
The upshot is that any 2r points on  are linearly independent. Each point k on 
corresponds (via the canonical bijection σ) to a t-dimensional subspace Ck of V (2rt, q).
Let z be a xed element of Ck. As α ranges over Fqt , αz ranges over all vectors in Ck.
So, to say that any 2r 1-subspaces of V (2r, qt) are linearly independent is also to say
that any 2rt points in V (2rt, q) gotten by taking 2r points on  and multiplying by
elements of Fqt−f0g, are linearly independent in V (2rt, q). Hence a given x 2 V (2rt, q)
can satisfy x 2 Ck for at most 2r values of k, when Ck are chosen among the qt + 1
available t-spaces corresponding to points on . Recall that r = ~r + 1, where ~r = m/t
is the number of message systems per tag system. So for any error,
pf  2((m/t) + 1)
qt + 1
. (15)
The same bound obviously holds for a \generalized Pauli" attack in which a unitary
error operator Ei is applied with probability pi (or any attack giving rise to an operation
with that Hellwig-Kraus decomposition). Explicitly, omitting the identity (since its




























 2(~r + 1)
qt+1
. (16)
By Lemma 1 (proved below) this bound on pf applies for general trace-preserving
CP-map attacks A as well.
2To forestall confusion note that prob(i ∈ C⊥k ) in the expression below is is equal to 1 or 0, as
i ∈ C⊥k or not—i.e., it’s the characteristic function of C⊥k evaluated on i.
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Dening the security parameter  := − log pf , we see that
  log (qt + 1)− log (m/t+ 1)− log 2  log qt − log (m/t) = t log q − logm+ log t.(17)
That is, security is (slightly super-)linear in the tag length. As in the Wegman-Carter
case, for xed t security eventually drops to zero with message length, but only loga-
rithmically in message length. The error probability is inversely related to the number
of keys, rather than to the square root of the number of keys as in a classical bound.
We now prove the lemma which reduces the security of a stabilizer QMAC against
arbitrary attacks to its security against Pauli attacks.
Lemma 1 For any stabilizer QMAC, its probability of failure under arbitrary TPCP-
map attacks is bounded above by its probability of failure under generalized Pauli attacks.
Proof: We use the representation of quantum operations from Knill and LaFlamme’s





where the jaii are (not necessarily orthogonal or normalized) states of an \environ-
ment", the Ai linear operators. This induces a CP map on density operators, also





The matrix a with elements aij := haijaji is positive since it is a matrix of inner products
(\Gram matrix"), and diagonalizing it generates a Hellwig-Kraus representation for the
operation. A is derived from a unitary operator, via UQEj0Eijψi = ∑i jaiiAijψi, if and








haijajiAyiAj = I , Ay(I) = I . (20)
This is the usual trace-preserving condition; when the Ai are a Hellwig-Kraus decom-




iAi = I. Trace-preservation implies
∑
iheijeii = 1. For
any operation A and any basis fAig of the space of operators, a representation of the
form (19) exists. For our analysis, we let the Ai be the Ei, our nice error basis, and
denote the corresponding environment states by jeii. Thus A(ρ) =
∑
ijheijejiEjρEyi .
Each stabilizer code Ck induces a partition of the error basis into undetectable
errors with index in C?k , and detectable errors with index in V − C?k . (The errors
with index in C?k include operators which, while they are errors in the sense of being
nonidentity operators of the error basis, act as the identity on the code Hk. As already
mentioned, we overestimate the probability of successful tampering by lumping them
with the rest of the errors in C?k , which have nontrivial action on the code Hk, but
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this will still give us a reasonable bound.) We may write the probability of error when
code Ck is used as
p
(k)
f = jj(Pk − jψkihψkj)
∑
i






Here, jψki 2 Hk is the encoded version of the input state jψi, encoded with code k.
Pk is the projector onto Hk. The last equality holds because for a stabilizer code, the
detectable errors (the ones not in C?k ) take the state into a syndrome space orthogonal














C?k is just the complement of C
?
k : the set of detectable errors. (The last equality just
uses trace-preservation of the overall operation of forgery followed by error detection;
essentially, it is just the statement that the probabilities of the answers \pass" and \fail"
in Bob’s authentication step sum to one.) By the inequality jjx + yjj2  jjxjj2 + jjyjj2









By trace-preservation of the operation A, heijeii are probabilities pi, so the same bounds
as for a generalized Pauli operation apply to pf .
6 Discussion
6.1 Key distribution and authentication
What is the relation of these data authentication codes to quantum key distribution
protocols? Certain QKD protocols, particularly those introduced by Deutsch, Ekert,
Jozsa, Macchiavello, Popescu and Sanpera [14], (DEJMPS), and further developed by
Lo and Chau [15] for their security proof, appear to transmit half of a maximally en-
tangled state, authenticate the transmission using entanglement purication, and then
use the correlations between measurements on halves of the entangled state to provide
classical key. However, entanglement purication requires some public discussion. This
must be conducted via an authenticated classical channel. Other QKD protocols also
require classical discussion. Thus QKD is most cleanly viewed as a way of turning an
authentic classical channel into a secret classical channel|impossible, classically, when
adversaries have unlimited computational power. The entanglement distribution-and-
purication version of QKD may be seen as turning an authentic classical channel and
a quantum channel into an authentic quantum channel, and then using the latter (with,
possibly, more use of the authentic classical channel) to obtain a secret classical chan-
nel. As Bennett noted [16], QKD can be part of a protocol in which some classical
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seed key is used to breed a much larger quantity of classical secret key. The seed key
authenticates the classical discussion. If such a QKD protocol proceeded by rst estab-
lishing the authenticity of a maximally entangled state, it would achieve one potential
goal of the present data authentication codes: using classical key to authenticate the
sharing of an entangled state. One could then use the entangled state to teleport a
quantum state (requiring further authenticated classical communication).
Two further points need to be made about such use of the Deutsch et. al./Lo
and Chau type QKD protocols to achieve quantum authentication. The rst point
is that in these protocols, the classical discussion is two-way. Hence they cannot be
used for authenticated storage, in which transmission is from the past to the future
of the same system, and there is no way to do two-way purication. The second
point is that the QKD-inspired protocols achieve something stronger than what is
required of a QMAC: at the end of the QKD-inspired protocol, both Alice and Bob know
that successful transmission has been achieved, whereas in a QMAC, only Bob knows.
Of course, a QMAC can be extended to achieve the stronger form of authentication
wherein both parties know when they have succeeded. This is done by Bob’s using
classical authentication (or quantum authentication of the classical message, which
may be more ecient) to let Alice know the protocol succeeded. Even though only
one bit is transmitted backwards, a large key may still be required for high security
authentication of this transmission as well. Key size will be nearly doubled over the
one-way version. (It is only a near-doubling since the initial Alice-to-Bob quantum
communication required a slightly longer key to authenticate, because it involved a
longer message.) Relatively little has been done to quantify the relationship between
the amount of classical seed key used, the amount of classical key or quantum pre-key
authenticated, and the security level with which it is authenticated. For the QMAC
protocols introduced here, we have addressed this matter explicitly.
For QKD protocols, the amount of classical seed key can also be much smaller than
the amount of key generated by the protocol. The bred key is not a one-time pad, for
one attack is to guess the seed key, and this succeeds with probability much greater
than the failure probability of a true one-time pad as long as the bred key. But that
probability may still be small enough. The important thing is that for any xed δ,
the probability of getting information δ about a message encrypted with the bred key
is inverse exponential in the seed key length, despite the message being much longer
than the seed key. And this is not possible, information-theoretically, via a classical
protocol. Shannon showed that any classical way of using s seed key bits, still leaves
m− s bits of information about the message in the clear.
We now consider the reverse possibility: that of using our QMAC’s for quantum
key distribution. In contrast to standard QKD, here classical \seed" key is used in the
quantum protocol from the outset. As in standard QKD, it may seed a much larger
quantum \proto-key". For data authentication will protect not only pure states of M ,
but also the entanglement of M with a system R which Alice keeps. Alice and Bob,
after satisfying themselves that M has not been tampered with, may obtain shared key
by each measuring their system in the appropriate basis, secure|although with failure
probability inverse exponential in the number of seed key bits|in the knowledge that
their measurement results are likely to be perfectly correlated. Of course, in order
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to use the system in this way, Bob must communicate the success of the QMAC to
Alice, with the attendant near-doubling of the key required. It would be interesting
to compare such key distribution to more standard protocols such as BB84 [17], the
six-state protocol [18],[19], or the obvious generalizations which use all the states of sets
of mutually unbiased bases in a pn-dimensional system [20], with regard to eciency
in the use of classical seed key and quantum communication.
6.2 Secrecy and authentication
In [21] and [22] it is shown that 2x classical key bits are necessary and sucient to
encrypt x qubits of quantum information perfectly securely, transforming any state
to the perfectly mixed state, when averaged over possible encryption keys. It is also
shown that a unitary chosen uniformly from any orthonormal basis of unitary operators
for the quantum system may serve as key. Because our QMACs appear to be using
the information-disturbance properties of quantum-mechanics, one might surmise that
ensuring a state’s authenticity is equivalent to encrypting it. For data authentication,
the density operator of the encoded state is not uniform, so the secrecy is not perfect.
The probability of successfully using a perfectly secrecy-encrypted quantum state in
some further task, without knowledge of the key, is bounded above by 1/d. But the
probability of successfully using a state encoded with a QMAC is no less than the
probability of guessing the MAC key, which may be above 1/d. Is the degree of secrecy
incidentally achieved by a QMAC at least as great as, or simply related to, its degree of
authenticicity? If so, this would be a peculiarly quantum relationship between secrecy
and authenticity, since in classical authentication secrecy and authenticity crowd each
other out (for xed key length), rather than going together.
Debbie Leung [4] has investigated the recycling of quantum key (entangled qubits)
and classical key (perfectly correlated secret bits) in quantum encryption schemes.
Here the goal is to ensure that key can be reused if tests indicated no eavesdropping
has taken place. Some of her results also give authentication schemes for quantum
messages. The tests that permit key recycling at a certain security level also assure
authenticity of the message with at least that security level. The resulting schemes
are quite practical since they do not require incidental perfect encryption, and have
key lengths (and extra communication requirements) linear in the security parameter
r (although they do not beat the bound of 2r for classical schemes).
7 Conclusion
We dened codes for authenticated communication or storage of quantum messages
or data, using sets of stabilizer codes derived from an algebraic curve over a Galois
eld. Their security level drops only logarithmically with message length, allowing
ecient authentication of long messages with small keys as in the classical Wegman-
Carter schemes. They are single-use authentication codes, and the error probability
is bounded above by a function proportional to the inverse of the number K of keys.
This bound is tight up to a constant, since the attack of just guessing the key succeeds
with probability 1/K. It is better than the classical bound of inverse square-root of
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the number of keys. Thus by quantum means, one may also authenticate classical
data more eciently than classically possible. Does the less stringent requirement of
reconstituting classical messages, rather than quantum ones, allow still more ecient
quantum protocols? The tightness of the bound means that this could give at best a
constant factor improvement in key length. Although we have not investigated multiple-
use quantum authentication schemes, there is less incentive to do so in the quantum
case because unlike in the classical situation, it seems unlikely one will gain much
eciency in key rate from multiple-use schemes|the 1/K bound applies regardless of
the number of uses the scheme is designed to be secure for.
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